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Abstract
In this paper we analyse a dynamic model of investment under uncertainty in a duopoly,
in which each firm has an option to switch from the present market to a new market.
We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies and show that both
preemption and attrition can occur along typical equilibrium paths. In order to determine
the attrition region a two-dimensional constrained optimal stopping problem needs to be
solved, for which we characterize the non-trivial stopping boundary in the state space.
We explicitly determine Markovian equilibrium stopping rates in the attrition region and
show that there is always a positive probability of eventual preemption, contrasting the
deterministic version of the model. A simulation-based numerical example illustrates
the model and shows the relative likelihoods of investment taking place in attrition and
preemption regions.
Keywords: Stochastic timing games, preemption, war of attrition, real options, Markov
perfect equilibrium, two-dimensional optimal stopping.
JEL subject classification: C61, C73, D21, D43, L13
MSC2010 subject classification: 60G40, 91A25, 91A55, 91A60
1 Introduction
Consider the following innocuous sounding investment problem involving two coffee shops
operating a similar franchise in a town. The profitability of each firm is influenced by some
stochastic process, representing uncertainty over the evolution of demand, costs, etc. Each
firm has an option to engage in product differentiation by switching to a rival franchise. When
should a firm switch franchise, if at all? This economic situation is a very basic example of a
timing game.1
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1This is a game because the actions of one firm have an influence on the other firm, in that if one coffee
shop switches the other firm becomes a (local) monopolist in the original franchise.
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In the literature on timing games a distinction is typically made between wars of attrition
and preemption, which result from situations with a second-mover or first-mover advantage,
respectively. In a game with a first-mover advantage there is a pressure on players to act
sooner than is optimal because of the fear of being preempted by the other player. In the
classical analysis by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) it is shown that the first-mover advantage
of becoming the leader is dissipated by preemption, inducing rent equalization in that both
firms obtain the second-mover, or follower payoff in expectation. In games with a second-
mover advantage the situation is radically different, because in such games each player wants
the other player to move first. This can lead players to take on some costs of waiting in
equilibrium, as shown e.g. by Hendricks et al. (1988).
Timing games have been used for instance in the industrial organization literature to ex-
plain a plethora of phenomena dealing with such issues as technology adoption (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1985), firms’ exit decisions in a duopoly (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986), and patent
races (Reinganum, 1982). Relatively early on in the development of the real options theory of
investment under uncertainty it was recognized that real options, unlike their financial coun-
terparts, are usually non-exclusive and that, thus, a game theoretic approach is needed. Many
contributions in this literature have focussed on analysing markets with a first-mover advan-
tage.2 The literature on game theoretic real options models with second-mover advantages is
less well-developed, with Hoppe (2000) and Murto (2004) being notable exceptions.
In this paper we want to think about duopolies in which both attrition and preemption can
occur, depending on the evolution of the market environment, and to construct a subgame
perfect equilibrium for such games. It is in such a model that the true power of stochastic
versus deterministic models becomes clear. Typically, in models with either a first- or second-
mover advantage, regardless of whether the model is deterministic or stochastic, it is clear
a priori what will happen in equilibrium: preemption in case of a first-mover and attrition
in the case of a second-mover advantage. It is just the timing that is different: on average
investment takes place later in a stochastic model. However, in many real-world situations it
not clear whether a market will develop into one with a first- or second-mover advantage. In
such cases one has to resort to a stochastic model.
Returning to the coffee franchise example, a switch by either firm changes the firms’
profitabilities in two ways: (i) there is a change in market structure and (ii) the stochastic
shocks under the new franchise follow a different process. The economic conflict here is the
influence that each firm has over its competitor by switching to the other franchise. If only
one firm switches, then each firm will operate as a monopolist in its respective market. This
is good for both firms, but potentially best for the firm that does not switch, because it does
2A non-exhaustive list of contributions is Smets (1991), Huisman and Kort (1999), Thijssen et al. (2012),
Weeds (2002), Boyer et al. (2004), Pawlina and Kort (2006). Extensive surveys can be found in Chevalier-
Roignant and Trigeorgis (2011) and Azevedo and Paxson (2014).
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not incur the sunk costs. This could lead to a war of attrition, i.e. a situation where it is
profitable for each firm to switch, but each prefers the other firm to do so. On the other
hand, if the profitability in the new market is higher than in the current market but not high
enough to make a duopoly in the new market profitable, then a situation of preemption may
occur. In such cases firms may try to switch before it is optimal to do so.
The novelty of the model we develop is that it can deal with attrition and preemption
simultaneously. We do this by using a two-dimensional state space, roughly speaking corre-
sponding to the profitability in each of the two markets. In equilibrium this state space will
effectively be split into three regions: a preemption region where both players try to preempt
each other, an attrition region where each firm prefers its competitor to invest, and a contin-
uation region where neither firm acts. Along a sample path the following may happen. If the
state hits the preemption region, then at least one firm invests instantly. If the state moves
through the attrition region, each firm invests at a certain rate (the attrition rate) until either
the preemption region is hit, or the attrition region is left towards the continuation region.
Inside the latter nothing happens until either the preemption region is hit directly or the
attrition region (again).
The richness of this model does present some technical challenges. Firstly, in regimes with
a second-mover advantage, payoffs of pure-strategy equilibria are generally asymmetric and
each firm prefers to become follower. Determining the roles is then a (commitment) problem
left open. By considering mixed strategies we can make the firms indifferent. With uncer-
tainty, however, the attrition region where the mixing occurs can be entered and left repeatedly
at random. We nevertheless obtain an equilibrium with Markovian stopping probabilities per
small time interval (the so-called attrition rate), while deterministic models typically contain
some simplifying smoothness assumption on the payoff functions. In the latter case the evo-
lution of the game is not only perfectly predictable, but also “slow”. Thus, when the attrition
rate becomes unbounded near the preemption region as the second-mover advantage van-
ishes, stopping occurs a.s. before reaching the preemption region. With our faster stochastic
dynamics, in contrast, there is always a positive probability of preemption to actually occur.
Another important issue relates to the value functions of the leader and follower roles.
Along a sample path, the game ends for sure as soon as the preemption region is entered.
This result has been known since the Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) analysis of a deterministic
preemption game. In our paper subgame perfection leads to similar equilibrium behavior.
Consequently, firms know ex ante that the game “ends” as soon as the preemption region is
first hit. Working backwards, this means that firms must take this into account when they
choose their strategy in the attrition region. In particular, as we will see, this has an effect
on the attrition region itself. Determining this region will require solving a genuinely two-
dimensional constrained optimal stopping problem. There are no known general techniques
to solve such problems (ours cannot be transformed into a one-dimensional problem like some
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models considered in the optimal stopping literature), but we are able to show that, quite
remarkably, our model has enough structure to fully characterize the attrition and preemption
regions.
Finally, we propose a simulation-based approach to numerically analyse the model. This
simulation shows, for a particular starting point in the continuation region, that many sample
paths actually reach the preemption region via the attrition region. This shows that our
results on stochastic versus deterministic models are economically important.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a stochastic dynamic model of a
market in which both first- and second-mover advantages can occur. In Section 3 we describe
the paper’s results in an informal way. The timing game is formally defined, analysed and
discussed in detail in Section 4. In particular we construct a subgame perfect equilibrium in
mixed (Markovian) strategies in Section 4.4. An important part of this construction consists of
solving a constrained optimal stopping problem in Section 4.3. Section 5 present a numerical
example that we use to discuss the economic content of our results and in Section 6 we
contrast our stochastic analysis with its deterministic version. Finally, Section 7 provides
some concluding remarks.
2 A Model with First- and Second-Mover Advantages: Prod-
uct Differentiation in a Duopoly
Consider two firms that are producing a homogeneous good. For instance, the firms could
be two coffee shops operating a similar franchise A in a town. The profitability of each
firm is influenced by some stochastic process. Each firm has an option to engage in product
differentiation and switch to a different franchise B. This switch involves some sunk costs (for
example due to refurbishment). To make matters more concrete, suppose that when firms
operate the same franchise Bertrand competition implies that both firms make no profits. If,
however, firms operate a different franchise both can be seen as monopolists in their respective
markets and they will earn some profit streams. The monopoly profits in franchises A and
B are given by the processes X = (Xt)t≥0 and Y = (Yt)t≥0, respectively, while there are
no profits in duopoly in either franchise. There is a sunk cost of switching I > 0. For
completeness we consider some additional running costs before and after switching denoted
by c0, cA and cB , respectively, but these have no qualitative impact and may also be ignored.
Depending on the net present value of the two monopoly profits X and Y and the total costs
of switching, it may at any time be more profitable to switch to the new market, to become
monopolist in the current market, or to stay in duopoly.
To obtain some explicit results we assume that X and Y are geometric Brownian motions,
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specifically as the unique solutions to the system of stochastic differential equations
dX
X
= µXdt+ σXdB
X and
dY
Y
= µY dt+ σY dB
Y (2.1)
with given initial values (X0, Y0) = (x, y) ∈ R
2
+. B
X and BY are Brownian motions that
may be correlated with coefficient ρ, and µX , µY , σX and σY are some constants representing
the drift and volatility of the growth rates of our profit processes X and Y , respectively.
We assume σ2X , σ
2
Y > 0 and |ρ| < 1 to exclude potential degeneracies that require separate
treatment (the case σX = σY = 0 is considered in Section 6). We also assume that profits are
discounted at a common and constant rate r > max(0, µX , µY ) to ensure finite values of the
following payoff processes and the subsequent stopping problems.3
Following the previous discussion, the basic payoffs can now be formulated by processes
L, F andM , which represent the expected payoffs at the time of the (first and only) switch to
(i) a firm that switches solely and becomes the leader, (ii) a firm that remains and becomes
the follower and (iii) a firm that switches simultaneously with the other, respectively.
At any time t ≥ 0 these processes take the values
Lt := −
∫ t
0
e−rsc0 ds+ E
[∫ ∞
t
e−rs(Ys − cB) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− e−rtI
= −
c0
r
+ e−rt
(
Yt
r − µY
−
cB − c0
r
− I
)
:= L(t, Yt),
Ft := −
∫ t
0
e−rsc0 ds+ E
[∫ ∞
t
e−rs(Xs − cA) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= −
c0
r
+ e−rt
(
Xt
r − µX
−
cA − c0
r
)
:= F (t,Xt) (2.2)
and
Mt := −
∫ ∞
0
e−rsc0 ds− e
−rtI
= −
c0
r
− e−rtI.
Note that these processes are continuous thanks to their respective representation by a con-
tinuous function of the underlying continuous profit processes X and Y . By those Markovian
representations we may also evaluate the payoff processes at any stopping time at which the
switch might occur to obtain the correct payoffs.4 All payoff processes are further bounded
3Then (e−rtXt) is bounded by an integrable random variable. Indeed, for σX > 0 we have supt e
−rtXt =
X0e
σXZ with Z = suptB
X
t −t(r−µX+σ
2
X/2)/σX , which is exponentially distributed with rate 2(r−µX)/σX+
σX (see, e.g., Revuz and Yor (1999), Exercise (3.12) 4
◦). Thus, E[supt e
−rtXt] = X0(1+σ
2
X/2(r−µX)) ∈ R+,
implying that (e−rtXt) is of class (D); analogously for σX < 0 and Y .
4If the switch occurs at a stopping time τ , one has to take conditional expectations at τ to determine the
appropriate payoff Lτ for example, which in general need not be consistent at all with a family of conditional
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by integrable random variables, cf. footnote 3, and they converge to −c0/r =: L∞ as t→∞.
We assume that it is optimal for only one firm to switch, specifically (c0 − cA)/r + I ≥ 0
to ensure F ≥M , and that the relative capitalized total cost of a single firm that switches is
nonnegative, i.e., (cB − cA)/r + I ≥ 0.
The firms will try to preempt each other in switching to the franchise B when L > F ,
which is the case iff
(X,Y ) ∈ P :=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+
∣∣∣ y > (r − µY )( x
r − µX
+
cB − cA
r
+ I
)}
.
We accordingly call P the preemption region of the state space R2+ of our process (X,Y ).
When F > L, each firm prefers to be the one who stays if there is a switch, which potentially
induces a war of attrition. We will model this strategic conflict as a timing game.
3 An Informal Preview of the Results
At this stage it is instructive to analyse the model informally and anticipate the equilibrium
construction that follows. To begin, in line with the literature on preemption games our game
has to end as soon as the set P is hit. However, to model this preemption outcome it is
not enough to consider distribution functions over time as (mixed) strategies.5 As there is no
“next period” in continuous time, one has to enable the firms both to try to invest immediately
but avoiding simultaneous investment at least partially, in particular on the boundary of P,
where they are still indifferent. We follow the endogenous approach of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985), augmenting strategies by “intensities” αi ∈ [0, 1] that determine the outcome when
both firms try to invest simultaneously like in an infinitely repeated grab-the-dollar game.
A firm that grabs first invests. If firm j grabs with stationary probability αj > 0, firm i
can obtain the follower payoff F by never grabbing, and αjM + (1 − αj)L by grabbing with
probability 1. Hence the firms are just indifferent between both actions in equilibrium if
α1 = α2 = α =
L− F
L−M
∈ (0, 1],
implying the expected local payoffs F (note that we have F ≥M). With symmetric intensities
the probability that either firm becomes leader is then
α(1− α) + (1− α)2α(1 − α) + · · · =
1− α
2− α
.
Taking limits, that probability becomes 12 on the boundary of P where α vanishes (see Remark
A.2 in the Appendix on the limit outcome). In the interior of P, however, there is a positive
expectations indexed by deterministic times t and a pointwise construction via t = τ (ω).
5See Hendricks and Wilson (1992) for a proof of equilibrium nonexistence.
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probability α/(2 − α) of simultaneous investment representing the cost of preemption, in
contrast to more ad hoc coordination devices.
Now consider states outside P. Suppose first that some firm tries to determine when it
would be optimal to make the switch and obtain the leader value L, which directly depends
only on Y . If the competitor could not preempt the firm, standard techniques would yield
that there is a threshold y∗ that separates the continuation region, where the firm remains
inactive, and the stopping region where the firm makes the switch. The optimal stopping time
is thus the first time the process Y enters the set [y∗,∞) and the process X plays no role in
this problem at all.
The firm should realize, however, that as soon as P is hit the game is over and it receives, in
expectation, the follower value, which does depend on X. Thus the firm should actually solve
the constrained optimal stopping problem to become leader up to the first hitting time of P.
Intuitively, the solution to this problem should again divide the (genuinely two-dimensional)
state space into two sets: a continuation set C and a stopping set A. The boundary between
these regions turns out to be given by a mapping x 7→ b(x), see Figure 1. b(x) increases to
y∗ for x → ∞, since then the probability of reaching P while waiting to get closer to the
unconstrained threshold y∗ is small.
x
y
y∗
y¯
yP
L = F
P
(L>F )
A
b(x)
C
Figure 1: Continuation, Attrition and Preemption regions.6
For smaller values of x, however, there is a higher risk to get trapped in preemption if P
is hit with Y < y∗. Thus it may be better to secure the current leader value before P is hit
at a possibly even lower value. We formally show that it is optimal to stop strictly before
P ∪R+× [y
∗,∞) is hit in the constrained stopping problem, i.e., the stopping boundary b(x)
lies below that region (in particular when preemption is “near”). In the interior of the stopping
set A we now have a situation alike a war of attrition: waiting without a switch occuring is
costly (the constrained leader value decreases in expectation), but becoming follower in this
region would yield a higher payoff F > L.
6The definitions of y¯ and yP will become clear in Section 4.3.
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We characterize the attrition region A below in terms of the stopping boundary b(x) for
the constrained leader’s stopping problem and identify the cost of waiting in this region as
the drift of L. In equilibrium the firms are only willing to continue and bear the cost in
A if there is a chance that the opponent drops out, yielding the follower’s payoff. We will
propose symmetric Markovian equilibrium hazard rates of investing – called attrition rates –
that make both firms exactly indifferent to continue in A. If we denote those rates here by
λt to give a heuristic argument, the probability that a firm invests in a small time interval
[t, t+ dt] is λt dt. Since each firm is supposed to be indifferent to wait, the equilibrium value
(i.e., expected payoff) Vt should satisfy
Vt = Ftλt dt+ (1− λt dt)E[Vt+dt |Ft] = Ftλt dt+ (1− λt dt)E[Vt + dVt |Ft]
⇔ λt dt =
−E[dVt |Ft]
Ft − Vt − E[dVt |Ft]
.
On the other hand we should have V=L in A by indifference and since the probability of
simultaneous investment is zero if the other firm invests at a rate. Hence E[dVt |Ft] is the
(here negative) drift of Lt of order o(dt), implying
λt dt =
−E[dLt |Ft]
Ft − Lt
.
We will model strategies more generally as distribution functions Gi(t) over time, such
that the hazard rates are actually λt dt = dGi(t)/(1 − Gi(t)). Note that in contrast to
deterministic models that develop linearly (with time t the state variable), we have to account
for the possibility that the state enters and leaves the attrition region frequently and randomly,
which makes indifference much more complex to verify. A distinctive feature of the exogenous
uncertainty is that there is always a positive probability of reaching the preemption region with
no firm having invested before, although the hazard rates λt grow unboundedly as F −L→ 0
near P; the latter does enforce investment in the deterministic analogue.
4 Formal Analysis of Subgame Perfect Equilibria
In this section we present and discuss in more detail the formal results that have been in-
troduced informally in Section 3. We start by formalizing the timing game (in particular
strategies and equilibrium concept) in Section 4.1, followed by establishing equilibria for sub-
games starting in the preemption region P in Section 4.2. The constrained optimal stopping
problem that identifies the attrition region A is analysed in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we
establish (Markovian) equilibrium strategies for arbitrary subgames.
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4.1 Timing Games: Strategies and Equilibrium
We use the framework of subgame perfect equilibrium for stochastic timing games with mixed
strategies developed in Riedel and Steg (2014). There is a fixed probability space (Ω,F , P )
capturing uncertainty about the state of the world, in particular concerning future profits. Our
firms can decide to switch to the new market B in continuous time t ∈ R+. The decision when
to switch can be based on some exogenous dynamic information represented by a filtration
F =
(
Ft
)
t≥0
satisfying the usual conditions (i.e., F is right-continuous and complete). It
includes the current observations of the profit processes X and Y , hence L, F and M are
adapted to F, too.
The feasible decision nodes in continuous time are all stopping times. Therefore any
stopping time ϑ represents the beginning of a subgame, with the connotation that no firm has
switched before. Let T denote the set of all stopping times w.r.t. the filtration F.
We will specify complete plans of actions for all subgames, taking the form of (random)
distribution functions over time. These have to be time-consistent, meaning that Bayes’ rule
has to hold wherever applicable. Additional strategy extensions serving as a coordination
device are needed to model preemption appropriately in continuous time.
Definition 4.1. An extended mixed strategy for firm i ∈ {1, 2} in the subgame starting at
ϑ ∈ T , also called ϑ-strategy, is a pair of processes
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
taking values in [0, 1], respectively,
with the following properties.
(i) Gϑi is adapted. It is right-continuous and nondecreasing with G
ϑ
i (t) = 0 for all t < ϑ,
a.s.
(ii) αϑi is progressively measurable.
7 It is right-continuous where αϑi < 1, a.s.
8
(iii)
αϑi (t) > 0⇒ G
ϑ
i (t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0, a.s.
We further define Gϑi (0−) ≡ 0, G
ϑ
i (∞) ≡ 1 and α
ϑ
i (∞) ≡ 1 for every extended mixed strategy.
Any stopping time τ ≥ ϑ can be interpreted as a pure strategy corresponding to Gϑi (t) =
1t≥τ for all t ≥ 0. If the G
ϑ
i jump to 1 simultaneously, the extensions α
ϑ
i determine the actual
outcome probabilities, so that simultaneous stopping is avoidable to a certain extent. The
α-components were first introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for deterministic games
7Formally, the mapping αϑi : Ω × [0, t] → R, (ω, s) 7→ α
ϑ
i (ω, s) must be Ft ⊗B([0, t])-measurable for any
t ∈ R+. It is a stronger condition than adaptedness, but weaker than optionality, which we automatically have
for Gϑi by right-continuity. Progressive measurability implies that α
ϑ
i (τ ) will be Fτ -measurable for any τ ∈ T .
8This means that with probability 1, αϑi (·) is right-continuous at all t ∈ [0,∞) for which α
ϑ
i (t) < 1. Since
we are here only interested in symmetric games, we may demand the extensions αϑi (·) to be right-continuous
also where they take the value 0, which simplifies the definition of outcomes. See Section 3 of Riedel and Steg
(2014) for issues with asymmetric games and corresponding weaker regularity restrictions.
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and allow for instantaneous coordination in continuous time. They can also be thought of as
measuring the “preemption intensity” of firms as they determine the probabilities with which
each firm succeeds in investing. In particular, at τˆϑ := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑ1 (t) + α
ϑ
2 (t) > 0}, the
extensions αϑ· determine final outcome probabilities λ
ϑ
L,i, λ
ϑ
L,j and λ
ϑ
M as defined in Riedel
and Steg (2014), which we provide for completeness in Appendix A.2. Here λϑL,i and λ
ϑ
L,j
denote the probabilities that firm i becomes the leader or follower, respectively. λϑM is the
probability that both firms invest simultaneously. Since the latter outcome is never desirable
(in the sense that firms would rather be the follower than end up in a situation of simultaneous
investment) this outcome has traditionally been referred to as a “coordination failure” (see,
for example, Huisman and Kort, 1999).
Now that the strategies have been formalized, we can define the firms’ payoffs. As with
strategies, these have to be defined for every subgame.
Definition 4.2. Given two extended mixed strategies
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
,
(
Gϑj , α
ϑ
j
)
, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
the payoff of firm i in the subgame starting at ϑ ∈ T is
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
:= E
[∫
[0,τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)
Ls dG
ϑ
i (s)
+
∫
[0,τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑi (s)
)
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s)
+
∑
s∈[0,τˆϑ)
∆Gϑi (s)∆G
ϑ
j (s)Ms
+ λϑL,iLτˆϑ + λ
ϑ
L,jFτˆϑ + λ
ϑ
MMτˆϑ
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
.
Since ϑ-strategies need to be aggregated across subgames, we need to introduce a notion
of time consistency.
Definition 4.3. An extended mixed strategy for firm i ∈ {1, 2} in the timing game is a family
(
Gi, αi
)
:=
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
ϑ∈T
of extended mixed strategies for all subgames ϑ ∈ T .
An extended mixed strategy
(
Gi, αi
)
is time-consistent if for all ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ∈ T
ϑ′ ≤ t ∈ R+ ⇒ G
ϑ
i (t) = G
ϑ
i (ϑ
′−) +
(
1−Gϑi (ϑ
′−)
)
Gϑ
′
i (t) a.s.
and
ϑ′ ≤ τ ∈ T ⇒ αϑi (τ) = α
ϑ′
i (τ) a.s.
Now the equilibrium concept is standard.
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Definition 4.4. A subgame perfect equilibrium for the timing game is a pair
(
G1, α1
)
,
(
G2, α2
)
of time-consistent extended mixed strategies such that for all ϑ ∈ T , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, and
extended mixed strategies
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a
)
V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) ≥ V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) a.s.,
i.e., such that every pair
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
,
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
is an equilibrium in the subgame at ϑ ∈ T ,
respectively.
4.2 Preemption Equilibria
We start our construction of a subgame perfect equilibrium by considering subgames with a
first-mover advantage Lϑ > Fϑ, i.e., starting in the preemption region P, where we can refer
to the following established equilibria in which at least one firm switches immediately.
Proposition 4.5 (Riedel and Steg (2014), Proposition 3.1). Fix ϑ ∈ T and suppose ϑ =
inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft} a.s. Then
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
,
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
defined by
αϑi (t) = 1Lt>Ft
Lt − Ft
Lt −Mt
for any t ∈ [ϑ,∞) and Gϑi = 1t≥ϑ, i = 1, 2, are an equilibrium in the subgame at ϑ.
The resulting payoffs are V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) = Fϑ.
In these equilibria, the firms are indifferent between stopping and waiting. The latter
would mean becoming follower instantaneously, as then the opponent switches with certainty.
If Lϑ > Fϑ, then there is a positive probability of simultaneous switching, which is the
“cost of preemption”, driving the payoffs down to Fϑ. Of particular interest are however
subgames ϑ with Lϑ = Fϑ, where each firm becomes leader or follower with probability
1
2 in
the equilibrium of Proposition 4.5 (given the outcome probabilities defined in Section A.2).
This is in particular the case in “continuation” equilibria at τP(ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft}
(where the game will hence end with probability 1) for subgames which begin with Lϑ ≤ Fϑ.
By these continuation equilibria the firms know that if the preemption region is ever reached,
then each firm can expect to earn the follower value at that time. This observation will turn
out to be important for constructing the equilibrium in the case of attrition.
4.3 Constrained Leader’s Stopping Problem
We now turn to equilibria for subgames beginning outside the preemption region where we will
observe a war of attrition in contrast to typical strategic real option models in the literature,
in which only preemption is considered. Our equilibria are closely related to a particular
stopping problem that we hence discuss in detail. Its value (function) will also be the player’s
11
continuation value in equilibrium and its solution is needed to characterize and understand
equilibrium strategies. This stopping problem is also of interest on its own as it is two-
dimensional and therefore not at all standard in the optimal stopping literature.
In accordance with Proposition 4.5 we fix the (equilibrium) payoff F whenever the state
hits the preemption region P. Suppose now that only one firm, say i, can make the switch
before P is reached. Then i can determine when to become optimally the leader up to hitting
P, where the game ends with the current value of F as the expected payoff.
Letting τP := inf{t ≥ 0 | (Xt, Yt) ∈ P} = inf{t ≥ 0 |Lt > Ft} denote the first hitting time
of the preemption region P, firm i now faces the problem of optimally stopping the auxiliary
payoff process
L˜ := L1t<τP + FτP1t≥τP .
It obviously suffices to consider stopping times τ ≤ τP . We are also only interested in initial
states (X0, Y0) = (x, y) ∈ P
c, which implies FτP = LτP by continuity. Then the value of our
stopping problem is
VL˜(x, y) := ess sup
τ≥0
E
[
L˜τ
]
= ess sup
τ∈[0,τP ]
E
[
Lτ
]
for (X0, Y0) = (x, y) ∈ P
c (and VL˜(x, y) := F0 for (X0, Y0) = (x, y) ∈ P). Thanks to the strong
Markov property, the solution of this problem can be characterized by identifying the stopping
region of the state space {(x, y) ∈ R2+ |VL˜(x, y) = L˜0 for (X0, Y0) = (x, y)} = P ∪ {(x, y) ∈
Pc |VL˜(x, y) = L(0, y)} and the continuation region
C := {(x, y) ∈ Pc |VL˜(x, y) > L(0, y)} ⊂ P
c.
By the continuity of L˜ (resp. L) it is indeed optimal to stop as soon as (X,Y ) hits Cc.
The stopping and continuation regions are related to those for the unconstrained problem
supτ≥0E
[
Lτ
]
, which only depends on Y and its initial value Y0 = y. This is a standard
problem of the real options literature, e.g., which is uniquely solved9 by stopping the first
time Y exceeds the threshold
y∗ =
β1
β1 − 1
(r − µY )
(
I +
cB − c0
r
)
,
with β1 > 1 the positive root of the quadratic equation
Q(β) ≡
1
2
σ2Y β(β − 1) + µY β − r = 0. (4.1)
At y∗, the net present value of investing in B as a monopolist is just high enough to offset
9The solution also holds in the degenerate case Y0 = y
∗ = 0, iff L is constant, but then it is not unique, of
course.
12
the option value of waiting.10
Now the constraint is binding iff the stopping region for the unconstrained problem does
not completely contain the preemption region P, which is the situation depicted in Figure 1
above with
y∗ > yP := (r − µY )
(
cB − cA
r
+ I
)
.11
Indeed, as stopping L is optimal for Yt ≥ y
∗ in the unconstrained case, it is too under the
constraint τ ≤ τP . Hence, if y
∗ ≤ yP , the continuation regions for the constrained and
unconstrained problems agree.
In the displayed case y∗ > yP , however, we have a much more complicated, truly two-
dimensional stopping problem.12 Then the stopping region for L˜ extends below P ∪ {(x, y) ∈
R
2
+ | y ≥ y
∗} due to the risk of hitting P at a lower value of Y when (X0, Y0) is close to P but
below y∗. Stopping is dominated, however, below the value
y¯ := cB − c0 + rI,
where the drift of L is positive, whence also y¯ < y∗ if either is positive.13 Furthermore we
show in the proof of the following proposition that it is always worthwhile to wait until Y
exceeds at least yP (if this is less than y
∗). The continuation region C and the stopping region
Cc for L˜ are then indeed separated by a function b(x) as shown.
Proposition 4.6. There exists a function b : R+ → [min(yP , y
∗), y∗] which is nondecreasing
and continuous, such that, up to the origin,
C = {(x, y) ∈ R2+ | y < b(x)} ⊂ P
c
and τCc := inf{t ≥ 0 | (Xt, Yt) ∈ C
c} attains VL˜(x, y) = E
[
L˜τCc
]
for (X0, Y0) = (x, y) ∈ R
2
+.
The origin belongs to C iff y∗ > 0, i.e., iff y¯ > 0. In that case b further satisfies b(x) ≥
min(y¯, yP + x(r − µY )/(r − µX)) (and otherwise b ≡ y
∗ and C = ∅).
10Above y∗, the forgone revenue from any delay is so high that investment is strictly optimal. Below y∗, the
depreciation effect on the investment cost is dominant to make waiting strictly optimal.
11yP ≥ 0 by our assumption on the parameters.
12Genuinely two-dimensional problems and their free boundaries are rarely studied in the literature due
to their general complexity. Sometimes problems that appear two-dimensional are considered, e.g. involving
a one-dimensional diffusion and its running supremum, which are then reduced to a one-dimensional, more
standard problem. See, e.g., Peskir and Shiryaev (2006).
13The drift of L, −e−rt(Yt − y¯) dt, can be derived by applying Ito¯’s formula to L(t, Yt) in (2.2). With y¯ we
also have
Lt = −
c0
r
+ E
[∫ ∞
t
e−rs(Ys − y¯) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
It holds that y¯ = 0 ⇔ y∗ = 0 and otherwise y∗/y¯ ∈ (0, 1), since β1µY < r (obviously if µY ≤ 0 and due
to Q(r/µY ) > 0 in (4.1) if µY > 0); furthermore y¯ > yP iff (c0 − cA)/(cB − cA + rI) < µY /r, e.g., if c0 is
sufficiently small or if I or cB are sufficiently large (while µY > 0).
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Proof: See appendix.
We show in Lemma 4.8 below that indeed b < y∗ if yP < y
∗; nevertheless b(x) ր y∗
since the value of the constrained problem converges to that of the unconstrained problem as
X0 →∞.
By the shape of C identified in Proposition 4.6, a firm that was sure never to become
follower outside P would switch as soon as the state leaves C: any delay on {Y > b(X)}∩{F >
L} would induce a running expected loss given by the drift of L, which is −e−rt(Yt− y¯) dt < 0
there. Switching would yield the other, staying firm the prize F > L, however. Since both
firms face the same situation, we obtain a war of attrition in the stopping region of the
constrained stopping problem: there is a running cost of waiting for a prize that is obtained
if the opponent gives in and switches. Therefore we call it the attrition region
A := {(x, y) ∈ R2+ | y ≥ b(x)} \ P.
14
In order to derive equilibria outside the preemption region P, we need to know exactly
the expected cost of abstaining to stop in A. In general this need not be just the (negative of
the) drift of L, e−rt(Yt− y¯) dt ≥ 0 in A, since the state can transit very frequently between A
and C.15 Our equilibrium verification uses the following characterization of the constrained
stopping problem and the cost of stopping too late. By the general theory of optimal stopping,
the value process of the stopping problem VL˜(X,Y ) := UL˜ is the smallest supermartingale
dominating the payoff process L˜, called the Snell envelope. As a supermartingale it has a
decomposition UL˜ =ML˜ −DL˜ with a martingale ML˜ and a nondecreasing process DL˜ called
the compensator starting from DL˜(0) = 0. Hence UL˜(0) − E[UL˜(τ)] = E[DL˜(τ)] ≥ 0 is the
expected cost if one considers only stopping after τ .
Given the geometry of the boundary between A and C that we have identified in Proposi-
tion 4.6, the increments of DL˜ are indeed given by the (absolute value of the) drift of L where
the state is in A.
Proposition 4.7. With b(x) as in Proposition 4.6 and (X0, Y0) 6= (0, 0) we have
dDL˜(t) = 1t<τP ,Yt≥b(Xt)e
−rt(Yt − y¯) dt (4.2)
for all t ∈ R+ a.s. If (X0, Y0) = (0, 0), (4.2) still holds if y
∗ ≤ 0 or yP > 0; otherwise
dDL˜ ≡ 0.
14Formally we only have A = Cc ∩ Pc up to the origin by Proposition 4.6, but we prefer to work with the
boundary representation. Precisely A ⊇ Cc ∩ Pc, and as b(x) lies below the preemption boundary yP + x(r −
µY )/(r − µX), in fact b(0) = min(yP , y
∗), so we have (0, 0) ∈ C ∩ A iff y∗ > 0 ≥ yP , resp. A = C
c ∩ Pc iff
y∗ ≤ 0 or yP > 0.
15This “switching on and off” of the waiting cost could lead to non-trivial behavior, depending on the local
time our process (X,Y ) spends on the boundary between the two regions given by y = b(x). See Jacka (1993)
for an example based on Brownian motion where that local time is non-trivial.
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Proof: See appendix.
With the concept of the Snell envelope UL˜ we can now show that b is not trivial, i.e., not
just the constraint applied to the unconstrained solution.
Lemma 4.8. If yP < y
∗, then also b < y∗.
Proof. Suppose b(xˆ) = y∗ > yP , hence y
∗ > 0. Then in particular for all X0 ≥ xˆ and Y0 = y
∗,
UL˜(0) = L˜0 = L0 = UL(0) with UL the (unconstrained) Snell envelope of L. For any stopping
time τ ,
UL˜(0) − E[UL˜(τ)] = E[DL˜(τ)] = E
[∫ τ∧τP
0
1Yt≥b(Xt)e
−rt(Yt − y¯) dt
]
and similarly for the unconstrained problem
UL(0)− E[UL(τ)] = E[DL(τ)] = E
[∫ τ
0
1Yt≥y∗e
−rt(Yt − y¯) dt
]
.
Let now X0 > xˆ, Y0 = y
∗ and τ = inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt ≤ xˆ} ∧ τP > 0. Then UL˜(τ) < UL(τ) on
{Yτ < y
∗}, which has positive probability by our nondegeneracy assumption, so E[UL˜(τ)] <
E[UL(τ)].
16 This contradicts all other terms in the previous two displays being equal, respec-
tively.
Remark 4.9. It is a difficult problem to characterize b more explicitly. However, by similar
arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4.8 one can obtain a scheme to approximate b (see also
our numerical study in Section 5). The Snell envelope UL˜, being a supermartingale of class
(D), converges in L1(P ) to UL˜(∞) = L˜∞ = LτP . Also its martingale and monotone parts
converge in L1(P ) as t → ∞, respectively. If Y0 ≥ b(X0), we further have UL˜(0) = L˜0 = L0.
Therefore,
UL˜(0)− E[UL˜(∞)] = L0 − E[LτP ] = E
[∫ τP
0
e−rt(Yt − y¯) dt
]
= E[DL˜(∞)] = E
[∫ τP
0
1Yt≥b(Xt)e
−rt(Yt − y¯) dt
]
and hence
Y0 ≥ b(X0) ⇒ E
[∫ τP
0
1Yt<b(Xt)e
−rt(Yt − y¯) dt
]
= 0. (4.3)
Since y∗ ≥ b, one can also use τP ∧ inf{t ≥ 0 |Yt ≥ y
∗} in (4.3). Any candidate bˆ for b should
satisfy bˆ ≥ y¯ like b itself. Therefore, if bˆ is (locally) too high (low), the expectation in (4.3)
will be positive (negative) for Y0 = bˆ(X0).
16For Y0 > 0, the optimal stopping time for L, i.e., the first time Y exceeds y
∗, is unique (up to nullsets),
but not admissible in the constrained problem for Y0, yP < y
∗, so analogously UL˜(τ ) < UL(τ ) on {Yτ < y
∗}.
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4.4 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We are now ready to combine the previous results to construct equilibria for arbitrary sub-
games. If the state reaches P, there is preemption with immediate switching by some firm.
In the continuation region C, the firms just wait. In the attrition region A, however, the
firms switch at a specific rate such that the resulting probability for the other to become
(more profitable) follower compensates for the negative drift of the leader’s payoff, making
each indifferent to wait or switch immediately.
Proposition 4.10. Suppose (X0, Y0) 6= (0, 0) or yP > 0. Fix ϑ ∈ T and set τP := inf{t ≥
ϑ |Lt > Ft}. Then
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
,
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
defined by
dGϑi (t)
1−Gϑi (t)
=
1Yt≥b(Xt)(Yt − y¯) dt
Xt/(r − µX)− (Yt − yP)/(r − µY )
(4.4)
on [ϑ, τP ) and G
ϑ
i (t) = 1 on [τP ,∞] and
αϑi (t) = 1Lt>Ft
Lt − Ft
Lt −Mt
on [ϑ,∞], i = 1, 2, are an equilibrium in the subgame at ϑ.
The resulting payoffs are
V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) = VL˜(Xϑ, Yϑ) = ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[
L˜τ
∣∣Fϑ]
with L˜ := L1t<τP + FτP1t≥τP .
Proof. Fix i ∈ {1, 2} and let j denote the other firm. The strategies satisfy the conditions
of Definition 4.1 (presupposing Gϑi (t) = α
ϑ
i (t) = 0 on [0, ϑ)). Note in particular that by our
nondegeneracy assumption, τP = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt ≥ Ft} unless (Xϑ, Yϑ) = (X0, Y0) = (0, 0) and
yP = 0, and thus except for that excluded case the denominator in (4.4) will not vanish before
τP . Now y¯ > Yt ≥ b(Xt) implies t ≥ τP by b(x) ≥ min(y¯, yP +x(r−µY )/(r−µX)) and hence
the proposed stopping rate is also nonnegative.17
The strategies are mutual best replies at τP by Proposition 4.5, i.e., given any value of
Gϑi (τP−), G
ϑ
i (t) = 1 on [τP ,∞] and α
ϑ
i (t) as proposed are optimal against
(
Gϑj , α
ϑ
j
)
and the
related payoff to firm i is E
[
(1 − Gϑi (τP−)
)(
1 − Gϑj (τP−)
)
FτP
∣∣ Fϑ]. It remains to show
optimality of Gϑi on [ϑ, τP ). Since G
ϑ
j is continuous on [ϑ, τP ) it follows from Riedel and Steg
(2014) that it is not necessary to consider the possibility that αϑi (t) > 0.
Given the proposed optimal αϑi and G
ϑ
i (t) = 1 on [τP ,∞], the related payoff at τP and
17Given the proposed rate, Gϑi (t) = 1− exp{−
∫ t
ϑ
(1−Gϑi (s))
−1 dGϑi (s)} on [ϑ, τP).
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the continuity of Gϑj up to τP , we can write the payoff from any G
ϑ
i on [ϑ, τP ) as
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫
[0,τP ]
(∫
[0,s)
Ft dG
ϑ
j (t) +
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)
Ls
)
dGϑi (s)
+ (1−Gϑi (τP−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τP−)
)
FτP
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
.
Further, noting (1 − Gϑi (τP−)
)(
1 − Gϑj (τP−)
)
FτP = ∆G
ϑ
i (τP)∆G
ϑ
j (τP)FτP and ∆G
ϑ
j (t) = 0
on [0, τP ), we obtain that
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫
[0,τP ]
Si(s) dG
ϑ
i (s)
∣∣∣∣Fϑ
]
where Si(s) =
∫
[0,s] Ft dG
ϑ
j (t) +
(
1 −Gϑj (s)
)
Ls. Thus G
ϑ
i is optimal iff it increases when it is
optimal to stop Si. We now show that this is the case anywhere in the attrition region A or
at τP .
The process Si is continuous on {ϑ < τP} because there LτP = FτP implies ∆Si(τP) =
∆Gϑj (τP)
(
FτP − LτP
)
= 0. Since L is a continuous semimartingale and Gϑj is monotone and
continuous on [0, τP ), Si satisfies
dSi(s) = (Fs − Ls) dG
ϑ
j (s) +
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)
dLs.
Using (Fs − Ls)dG
ϑ
j (s) =
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)
1Ys≥b(Xs)e
−rs(Ys − y¯) ds on [ϑ, τP ) yields
dSi(s) =
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)(
dLs + 1Ys≥b(Xs)e
−rs(Ys − y¯) ds
)
.
Recalling L˜ from Subsection 4.3 (with τP adjusted for ϑ), and its Snell envelope UL˜ and
compensator DL˜ identified in Proposition 4.7, we have in fact
dSi(s) =
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)(
dL˜s + dDL˜(s)
)
on [ϑ, τP ] where ϑ < τP . We first ignore (1 − G
ϑ
j ) and argue that it is optimal to stop
L˜ + DL˜ anywhere in the attrition region A or at τP . Indeed, as UL˜ = ML˜ − DL˜ is the
smallest supermartingale dominating L˜, UL˜+DL˜ =ML˜ must be the smallest supermartingale
dominating L˜+DL˜, i.e., the Snell envelope of L˜+DL˜. As ML˜ is a martingale, any stopping
time τ with ML˜(τ) = L˜τ +DL˜(τ)⇔ UL˜(τ) = L˜τ a.s. is optimal for L˜+DL˜, which is satisfied
where the proposed Gϑi increases (i.e., in A or at τP).
18 Instead of stopping L˜ + DL˜, we
18By Proposition 4.6, A∩C could only be reached at the origin, i.e., by (Xτ , Yτ ) = (0, 0)⇔ (X0, Y0) = (0, 0)
and if yP = 0 (cf. footnote 14), which we have excluded. UL˜(τP) = L˜τP holds by definition.
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actually have to consider, for any τ ∈ [ϑ, τP ],
Si(τ)− Si(ϑ) =
∫
[ϑ,τ ]
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)(
dL˜s + dDL˜(s)
)
=
(
1−Gϑj (τ)
)(
L˜τ +DL˜(τ)
)
− L˜ϑ −DL˜(ϑ)
+
∫
[ϑ,τ ]
(
L˜s +DL˜(s)
)
dGϑj (s).
The presence of (1−Gϑj ) thus acts like a constraint compared to stopping L˜+DL˜. However,
Gϑj places its entire mass favorably, as it also only increases when it is optimal to stop L˜+DL˜.
Therefore the payoff from optimally stopping Si is indeed that from L˜ +DL˜, i.e., ML˜(ϑ) =
UL˜(ϑ) (withDL˜(ϑ) = 0), and the same stopping times are optimal. The proof is now complete.
The Markovian equilibrium stopping rate (4.4) is the (absolute value of the) drift of L in
A divided by the difference F − L, ensuring the exact compensation that makes each firm
indifferent as discussed before. Waiting is strictly optimal if (X,Y ) ∈ C, where the equilibrium
payoff is UL˜ > L.
Although the stopping rate (4.4) becomes unboundedly large as the state approaches the
preemption region – because the denominator F −L vanishes while the numerator is bounded
away from zero – the cumulative stopping probability does not converge to 1. There will indeed
be some mass left when reaching the preemption boundary. This is a distinctive feature of
our stochastic model19 that is not observed in deterministic versions, cf. Section 6.
Proposition 4.11. The strategies Gϑi specified in Proposition 4.10 satisfy ∆G
ϑ
i (τP) > 0 on
{τP <∞} a.s.
Proof: See appendix.
Concerning the regularity of αi, note that we can only have L ≤M on {Y ≤ yP} by our
assumption (c0 − cA)/r + I ≥ 0, whence L > M on {(X,Y ) ∈ P ∪ ∂P} a.s. if X0 > 0; so αi
will be continuous and vanish on {(X,Y ) ∈ ∂P}.20
19The mathematical question underlying Proposition 4.11 is of interest in its own right. With the same
arguments used in the proof (which then become much simpler) one can show that for a Brownian motion B
started at a > 0 one has ∫ τ0
0
1
Bt
dt <∞
a.s., where τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0 |Bt ≤ 0}. We actually consider the reciprocal of the process Zt = Xt − Yt + a with
our geometric Brownian motions X, Y .
20In the particular case X0 = 0, X ≡ 0 and
αi(t) =
Lt − Ft
Lt −Mt
1Lt>Ft =
(Yt − yP)1Yt>yP
Yt − yP + (r − µY )(I − (cA − c0)/r)
.
Then αi will still be continuous for I > (cA − c0)/r and unity on {Y ≥ yP} for I = (cA − c0)/r.
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We can easily aggregate the equilibria to a subgame perfect equilibrium since all quantities
are Markovian.
Theorem 4.12. The strategies
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
ϑ∈T
, i = 1, 2 of Proposition 4.10 form a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Remark 4.13. If X0 = 0 < Y0, the game is played “on the y-axis” and the derived equilibria
are as follows. There is preemption as soon as Y exceeds the preemption point yP . Any y
less than b(0) = min(yP , y
∗) is in the continuation region, so there is attrition iff (y∗)+ < yP ,
between those points.
If Y0 = 0, the game is played “on the x-axis” and is actually deterministic since we then
have τP = ∞ by our assumption yP ≥ 0. In fact, now Ft > Lt ∀t ∈ R+ if X0 ∨ yP > 0, and
dLt = e
−rty¯ dt. Thus, if y¯ ≥ 0, stopping is dominated for t ∈ R+, strictly if y¯ > 0 or against
any strategy that charges [0,∞), while the proposed equilibrium strategies only charge [∞].21
If y¯ < 0, also b ≡ y∗ < 0, and there is permanent attrition with rate −dL/(F − L).
In the completely degenerate case that further X0 = yP = 0, the stopping rate of Propo-
sition 4.10 is not well defined. Now, however, L ≡ F and there are the following equilibria:
for y¯ > 0, both firms wait indefinitely, for y¯ = 0, any strategy pair with no joint mass points
are an equilibrium, and for y¯ < 0, one firm switches immediately and the other abstains.
5 A Numerical Example
As an illustration of the model we present a numerical example to show the consequences of
the results presented so far. The parameter values of our base case are given in Table 1.
c0 = 3.5 cA = 4.5 cB = 5 I = 100 r = .1
µY = .04 µX = .04 σY = .25 σX = .25 ρ = .4
Table 1: Parameter values for a numerical example
For this case it holds that y∗ = 17.45. The preemption region is depicted in Figure 2a.
Finding the boundary x 7→ b(x) as characterized in Proposition 4.6 is not trivial as can be seen
from Remark 4.9. However, it is known from the literature on numerical methods for pricing
American options (see, for example, Glasserman, 2004 for an overview) that a piecewise linear
or exponential approximation often works well. In our case, we hypothesize an exponential
boundary of the form
b(x) = y∗ − (y∗ − y¯)e−γ(x−x¯),
where x¯ is the unique such that (x¯, y¯) is on the boundary of P, and γ is a free parameter.
21Indeed, if y¯ = y∗ = 0, b ≡ y∗ = 0, while if y¯ > 0 ⇔ y∗ > 0, then b(Xt) > 0 for X0 + yP > 0 by
b(x) ≥ min(y¯, yP + x(r − µY )/(r − µX )).
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A rough implementation now consists of hypothesizing a value for γ, followed by simulating
3,000 sample paths for several starting values close to this boundary. The optimal boundary
should be such that simulated continuation values are uniformly slightly larger than the
leader value. Using a manual search across several values for γ suggests a value of .0984 and
a boundary as depicted in Figure 2b.
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Figure 2: Preemption, attrition and continuation regions for numerical example.
Once the boundary is established we can simulate equilibrium sample paths using the
equilibrium strategies from Theorem 4.12. Two sample paths, together with their realizations
of the attrition rate (4.4) are given in Figures 3 and 4. In parallel to the paths we sample
the investment decisions from the respective attrition rates. The displayed paths end where
investment takes place.
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Figure 3: Sample path ending in preemption and its realized attrition rate.
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Figure 4: Sample path ending in attrition region and its realized attrition rate.
Note that, even though the two sample paths start at exactly the same point (X0, Y0) =
(6, 8), their equilibrium realizations are very different. In the sample path t 7→ (Xt(ω1), Yt(ω1))
in Figure 3 the attrition region is entered and exited several times before, finally, the sample
path hits the preemption boundary. At that time the realized attrition rate has gone up
to about G0j (τP(ω1)−) ≈ .045, j = 1, 2. However, no firm has invested up to time τP(ω1).
At time τP(ω1) we have (G
τP (ω1)
j (τP (ω1)), α
τP (ω1)
j (τP(ω1))) = (1, 0), j = 1, 2, so that (see
Appendix A.2) each firm is the first to invest at time τP(ω1) with probability λ
τP (ω1)
L,i = .5.
So, the ω1 sample path ends with investment taking place when there is, just, a first-mover
advantage. In the sample path t 7→ (Xt(ω2), Yt(ω2)) in Figure 4 the attrition region is again
entered and exited several times. Note that the first entry of the attrition region is at roughly
the same time as along the ω1 sample path. At time 2.5 (approximately), when the attrition
rate realization has gone up to G0j (1.4) ≈ .07, j = 1, 2, one of the two firms actually invests,
thereby handing the other firm the second-mover advantage.
Finally, we run a simulation of 3,000 sample paths, all starting at (X0, Y0) = (6, 8), and
record whether the game stops in the attrition or preemption region. We find that 80% of
sample paths end with preemption, whereas 20% of sample paths end in the attrition region.
A scatter diagram of values (Xτ(ω), Yτ(ω)) at the time of first investment is given in Figure 5.
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The average fraction of time spent in the attrition region is 6.76% and all of sample paths
experience attrition before the time of first investment. The value of immediate investment
is -16.67, whereas the (simulated) value of the equilibrium strategies is 12.02.
22This figure excludes outliers in both dimensions.
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Figure 5: Scatter plot of realizations of (Xτ∗ , Yτ∗).
6 Differences between Deterministic and Stochastic Models
For comparative purposes, we now briefly analyse a deterministic version of our model, i.e.,
setting σX = σY = 0. The expressions for Lt, Ft and Mt provided in (2.2) then remain
the same. In order to avoid the distinction of many different cases, we concentrate on the
most “typical” one representing the economic story that we have in mind. Therefore assume
that the market B is growing at the rate µY > 0 from the initial value Y0 > 0. Further
assume that µY ≥ µX , so that it is only market B that can possibly overtake the other, A,
in profitability.23 The same holds then for the functions L and F : Now we have preemption
due to Lt > Ft iff (Xt, Yt) ∈ P, which is iff
eµY t
(
Y0
r − µY
−
X0
r − µX
e(µX−µY )t
)
>
cB − cA
r
+ I. (6.2)
23If µX > µY and X0 > 0, the behavior differs from that discussed in the main text as follows. Now the
profitability of market A will eventually outgrow that of market B and preemption occurs during a bounded
time interval (if at all). Indeed, since
∂(Lt − Ft)
∂t
= eµX t
(
µY Y0
r − µY
e(µY −µX)t −
µXX0
r − µX
)
(6.1)
has at most one zero and is negative for t sufficiently large, (Lt − Ft) grows until its maximum and then
declines, so {t |Lt−Ft > 0} forms an interval (if nonempty). Arranging (Lt−Ft) similarly as (6.1) shows that
(Lt − Ft) is negative for t sufficiently large, which bounds the previous interval.
Supposing that the preemption interval is nonempty and that µY > 0, the unique maximum of Lt attained
at t = t¯ may occur before, during or after preemption. We can observe attrition followed by preemption only
in the first case, i.e., if Lt¯ < Ft¯ and ∂(Lt¯ − Ft¯) > 0, which is if Xt¯/(r − µX ) (see the right of (6.3)) lies in(
y¯/(r−µY )−(cB−cA)/r−I, µY y¯/(µX(r−µY ))
)
. This interval is nonempty, e.g., if µX and µY are sufficiently
close.
In subgames after the preemption interval there will be indefinite attrition for all t ≥ t¯.
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The LHS is the product of two nondecreasing functions and the RHS is nonnegative by our
assumption made in Section 2. Hence Lt > Ft for all
t > inf{t ≥ 0 |Lt > Ft} =: tP
and preemption will indeed occur iff the LHS of (6.2) ever becomes positive, i.e., tP <∞ ⇔
µY > µX or Y0/(r − µY ) > X0/(r − µX). Preemption does not start immediately at t = 0 iff
Y0/(r − µY )−X0/(r − µX) < (cB − cA)/r + I, i.e., tP > 0 ⇔ (X0, Y0) 6∈ P.
Now the constrained stopping problem to maximize Lt over t ≤ tP is very easy. As Lt is
increasing iff Yt < y¯, i.e., iff Y0 < y¯ and
t <
1
µY
ln
(
y¯
Y0
)
=: t¯,
the solution is to stop at the unconstrained optimum t = t¯ (resp. at t = t¯ := 0 if Y0 ≥ y¯) or
at the constraint t = tP if it is binding. The solution is also unique since Lt in fact strictly
increasing for Yt < y¯ and strictly decreasing for Yt ≥ y¯.
As a consequence, stopping is strictly dominated before the constrained optimum min(t¯, tP)
is reached and we can only observe attrition in equilibrium if the unconstrained maximum of
L is reached before preemption starts. It indeed holds that Lt¯ < Ft¯ (given Y0 < y¯) iff
Yt¯
r − µY
−
cB − cA
r
− I <
Xt¯
r − µX
⇔
y¯
r − µY
−
cB − cA
r
− I <
X0e
µX t¯
r − µX
=
X0
r − µX
(
y¯
Y0
)µX
µY
(6.3)
(and L0 < F0 ⇔ (X0, Y0) 6∈ P for Y0 ≥ y¯), so that there will be attrition iff the initial
profitability X0 of market A is large enough to let Yt exceed y¯ before (Xt, Yt) ∈ P.
24 Once
Yt > y¯, resp. t > t¯, Lt strictly decreases and we observe attrition until preemption starts at
tP .
The equilibrium can now be represented as in Proposition 4.10, resp. Theorem 4.12, with
the fixed preemption start date tP replacing τP(ϑ) throughout and t ≥ t¯ replacing the dynamic
attrition boundary Yt ≥ b(Xt). Note that if there is attrition before the preemption region is
reached, stopping will now occur with probability 1 due to attrition.25
24If µX 6= 0, the path that (Xt, Yt) takes in the state space R
2
+ is given by the relation y = Y0(x/X0)
(µY /µX ).
For µX = 0, it is of course just {(X0, y) | y ≥ Y0}.
25In analogy (in fact contrast) to Proposition 4.11 and its proof it suffices to verify that∫ τP
0
dt
Xt − Yt + a
=∞
when in the simplified notation τP = inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt − Yt ≤ a} ∈ (0,∞), since we are only interested in the
case YτP > y¯ so that Yt is bounded away from y¯ near τP , where the above integral explodes. Indeed, with
23
As a numerical example, we use the same parameter values as before, but set σX = σY = 0.
For easy reference, the left-panel of Figure 6 includes the approximate boundary for the
attrition region as derived in Section 5. Note that for each sample path it is clear a priori
that the game ends in attrition and that, once the attrition region is entered, it will never be
exited again. As a result, the equilibrium attrition rate is a smooth function of time as can
be seen in the right-panel of Figure 6. In this example non of the sample paths will ever end
in preemption.
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Figure 6: Paths and attrition rates for deterministic case.
If, however, we take the same example, but with µY = .06 and µX = .02, then the
situation is very different. Figure 7 shows three sample paths that all end in preemption.
Consequently, the attrition rate increases smoothly to 1 at the time the preemption region
is hit. This is, again, very different from the typical sample path of the attrition rate as
discussed in Section 5.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have built a continuous time stochastic model capturing a natural strategic
investment problem that induces a sequence of local first- and second-mover advantages de-
pending on the random evolution of the environment. Our focus has been mainly on regimes
with second-mover advantages, as these are far more rarely considered in the real options lit-
erature. Despite the non-predictable development of the game we have constructed subgame
Zt = Xt − Yt + a we have limt→τP Zt = 0 and dZt = (µXX0e
µX t − µY Y0e
µY t) dt and hence
∞ = lim
t→τP
− ln(Zt) = − ln(Z0)−
∫ τP
0
µXX0e
µX t − µY Y0e
µY t
Xt − Yt + a
dt.
As the numerator in the integral is bounded on the assumed finite interval [0, τP ], the claim follows.
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Figure 7: Paths and attrition rates for deterministic case.
perfect (Markovian) equilibria, for which we made use of different approaches from the theory
of optimal stopping – given that we identified stopping problems at the heart of equilibrium
construction that are not standard in the literature.
Even though we have made some strong assumptions on the underlying stochastic pro-
cesses, choosing a quite specific form, it should be clear that our results – in particular the
economics driving our equilibria – can be generalized to other underlying payoff processes.
The assumption of geometric Brownian motion is mainly made so that the leader and follower
payoff processes can be explicitly computed.
An economically important avenue for future research is to enrich the economic environ-
ment by introducing a continuation value for the follower. This could be even extended to a
model where firms can switch as often as they wish. Such an extension, however, does not
fall into the framework of timing games employed here, but will require a richer model of
subgames and, particularly, histories (of investment).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.6. First consider Y0 = 0, which is absorbing. By our assumptions
yP ≥ 0, so (R+, 0) ⊂ P
c. For Y ≡ 0 hence τP = ∞ (so we face an unconstrained, deter-
ministic problem) and thus (x, 0) ∈ C ⇔ VL˜(x, 0) > L(0, 0) ⇔ 0 < y
∗ by the solution of the
unconstrained problem, or directly from dLt = e
−rty¯ dt for Y0 = 0 and y
∗ > 0 ⇔ y¯ > 0. In
this case τCc =∞ is optimal, and τCc = 0 if y
∗ ≤ 0.
We now establish the monotonicity of the stopping and continuation regions for L˜ in the
whole state space by strong path comparisons. Therefore denote the solution to (2.1) for
given initial condition (X0, Y0) = (x, y) ∈ R
2
+ by (X
x, Y y) = (xX1, yY 1). Further write
the continuation region as C = {(x, y) ∈ R2+ |VL˜(x, y) > L˜(x, y)} ⊂ P
c, where L˜(x, y) :=
L(0, y)1(x,y)∈Pc + F (0, x)1(x,y)∈P ; cf. (2.2). This means that if we fix any (x0, y0) ∈ C, then
there exists a stopping time τ∗ ∈ (0, τP ] a.s. with VL˜(x0, y0) ≥ E
[
L˜τ∗
]
= E
[
L(τ∗, Y y0τ∗ )
]
>
L˜(x0, y0) = L(0, y0). Now fix an arbitrary ε ∈ (0, y0) implying that (X
x0 , Y y0−ε) = (Xx0 , Y y0−
εY 1) starts at (x0, y0 − ε) ∈ P
c and τ∗ ≤ τP ≤ inf{t ≥ 0 | (X
x0
t , Y
y0−ε
t ) ∈ P}.
Hence, VL˜(x0, y0−ε) ≥ E
[
L(τ∗, Y y0−ετ∗ )
]
= E
[
L(τ∗, Y y0τ∗ )−e
−rτ∗εY 1τ∗/(r−µY )
]
> L(0, y0)−
E
[
e−rτ
∗
εY 1τ∗/(r−µY )
]
≥ L(0, y0)−ε/(r−µY ) = L(0, y0−ε) = L˜(x0, y0−ε). The last inequality
is due to (e−rtY 1) being a supermartingale by r > µY .
As ε was arbitrary we can define b(x) := sup{y ≥ 0 |VL˜(x, y) > L˜(x, y)} for any x ∈ R+
where that section of the continuation region is nonempty and conclude VL˜(x, y) > L˜(x, y)
for all y ∈ (0, b(x)). Then we have b(x) ≤ y∗ because immediate stopping is optimal in the
unconstrained problem for Y0 ≥ y
∗, formally L(0, y) = L˜(x, y) ≤ VL˜(x, y) ≤ UL(0) = L(0, y)
for any (X0, Y0) = (x, y) ∈ P
c with y ≥ y∗.26 The same argument shows that the continuation
region is empty if y∗ ≤ 0. In this case we can set b(x) := y∗.
The section of the continuation region for arbitrary x ≥ 0 is in fact only empty if y∗ ≤ 0,
which completes the definition of b. Indeed, we have seen at the beginning of the proof that
(R+, 0) ⊂ C if y
∗ > 0 (and therefore actually (x, y) ∈ C for all y ∈ [0, b(x))). We could
also have applied the following important estimate for x > 0. If y∗ > 0, i.e., if y¯ > 0, then
b(x) ≥ min(y¯, yP + x(r − µY )/(r − µX)), which follows from the fact that L is a continuous
semimartingale with finite variation part
∫ t
0
−e−rs(Ys − y¯) ds,
as can be seen from applying Ito¯’s Lemma. This drift is strictly positive on {Y < y¯}, where
stopping L is therefore suboptimal and so it is too for L˜ (up to τP).
26Here UL is the Snell envelope of L , i.e., the value process of the unconstrained stopping problem. See also
the corresponding discussion for L˜ following Proposition 4.6.
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For the monotonicity of b pick any (X0, Y0) = (x0, y0) ∈ C and τ
∗ ≤ τP as before and fix
an arbitrary ε > 0. Then (Xx0+ε, Y y0) = (Xx0 + εX1, Y y0) starts at (x0 + ε, y0) ∈ P
c and
τ∗ ≤ τP ≤ inf{t ≥ 0 | (X
x0+ε
t , Y
y0
t ) ∈ P}. Now VL˜(x0 + ε, y0) ≥ E
[
L(τ∗, Y y0τ∗ )
]
> L(0, y0) =
L˜(x0 + ε, y0), whence b(x0 + ε) ≥ b(x0).
The continuity of b in x0 = 0 holds by the following estimates. Below we show that b(x) ≥
min(yP , y
∗), which together with monotonicity yields a right-hand limit and b(0), b(0+) ≥
min(yP , y
∗). On the other hand, by definition b(x) ≤ yP + x(r− µY )/(r− µX) and b(x) ≤ y
∗
as shown above. Hence b(0) = b(0+) = min(yP , y
∗). To verify the continuity of b in x0 > 0
we show that if (x0, y0) ∈ C, then also the line {(x, y) ∈ R
2
+ |x ∈ (0, x0], y = xy0/x0} ⊂ C.
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As the first step, we check that given (X0, Y0) = (x0, y0) ∈ P
c, τP ≤ inf{t ≥ 0 | (X
x
t , Y
y
t ) ∈ P}
for any point (x, y) on the specified line. Indeed, for any (Xx, Y y) we can write
Lt ≤ Ft ⇔
Y yt
r − µY
−
Xxt
r − µX
≤
cB − cA
r
+ I =
yP
r − µY
⇔
y
r − µY
Y 1t −
x
r − µX
X1t ≤
yP
r − µY
.
If y = xy0/x0 this becomes
y
r − µY
Y 1t −
x
r − µX
X1t =
x
x0
(
y0
r − µY
Y 1t −
x0
r − µX
X1t
)
≤
yP
r − µY
.
As yP/(r − µY ) is nonnegative, the condition for (x, y) is implied by the one for (x0, y0) if
x ∈ [0, x0]. Therefore, if we fix any point on the line {(x, y) ∈ R
2
+ |x ∈ (0, x0], y = xy0/x0},
we have τ∗ ≤ inf{t ≥ 0 | (Xxt , Y
y
t ) ∈ P}, where τ
∗ as before satisfies E
[
L(τ∗, Y y0τ∗ )
]
> L(0, y0)
for the given (x0, y0) ∈ C.
In particular (x, y) ∈ Pc. Now suppose also (x, y) ∈ Cc. Then L(0, y) = VL˜(x, y) ≥
E
[
L(τ∗, Y yτ∗)
]
= E
[
L(τ∗, Y y0τ∗ )− e
−rτ∗(y0− y)/(r−µY )Y
1
τ∗
]
> L(0, y0)−E
[
e−rτ
∗
(y0− y)/(r−
µY )Y
1
τ∗
]
≥ L(0, y0) − (y0 − y)/(r − µY ) = L(0, y), a contradiction (where we again used the
fact that (e−rtY 1) is a supermartingale). Thus, (x, y) ∈ C.
Now we argue that ∂C ⊂ Cc, except possibly for the origin. Suppose y∗ > 0, i.e., y¯ > 0
(otherwise C = ∅). By b(x) ≥ min(y¯, yP + x(r − µY )/(r − µX)), the only point in ∂C with
y = b(x) = 0 can be the origin (and that only if yP = 0). If y = Y0 > 0 and (X0, Y0) ∈ ∂C,
then (X,Y ) will enter the interior of Cc immediately with probability 1. Indeed we have shown
that b(x+h) ≤ b(x)+hb(x)/x for any x, h > 0, which implies with the monotonicity of b that
27A graphical illustration helps to convey the continuity argument for b(x).
y
y0
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if Y0 = b(X0) > 0 and X0 > 0, then {Yt > b(Xt)} ⊃ {Yt > Y0} ∩ {Yt > Y0Xt/X0} = {(µY −
σ2Y /2)t+σYB
Y
t > 0}∩{(µY−σ
2
Y /2)t+σYB
Y
t −(µX−σ
2
X/2)t−σXB
X
t > 0}. After normalization
we see that the latter two sets are both of the form {Bt + µt > 0} for some Brownian motion
B with drift µ ∈ R (we normalize by σY in the first and (σ
2
Y −2ρσXσY +σ
2
X)
1/2 in the second
case; recall σYB
Y and σYB
Y − σXB
X are not degenerate). Therefore, the hitting times of
either set, which we denote by τ1 and τ2 are 0 a.s., and P [inf{t ≥ 0 |Yt > b(Xt)} = 0] ≥
1 − P [τ1 > 0] − P [τ2 > 0] = 1, i.e., the correlation ρ between B
X and BY is not important.
A simpler version of the argument applies to the case X0 = 0 and Y0 = b(0) > 0, when
{Yt > b(Xt)} = {Yt > Y0}.
It remains to prove that b(x) ≥ min(yP , y
∗). If y∗ ≤ yP then τP ≥ τ
∗(y) := inf{t ≥
0 |Yt ≥ y
∗} for (X0, Y0) = (x, y) ∈ P
c and thus E
[
Lτ∗(y)
]
= UL(0) ≥ VL˜(x, y) ≥ E
[
Lτ∗(y)
]
.
Hence, UL(0) = VL˜(x, y) > L(0, y) = L˜(x, y) for y < y
∗, implying b(x) ≥ y∗.
For y∗ > yP we will show that L˜(x, y) = L(0, y) < E
[
Lτ(yP )
]
≤ VL˜(x, y) for any (x, y) with
y < yP , where τ(yP) := inf{t ≥ 0 |Yt ≥ yP} ≤ τP , which implies that b(x) ≥ yP . On {Y0 =
y < yP} we obtain by the definition of yP that E
[
Lτ(yP )
]
= −c0/r + (y/yP)
β1(c0 − cA)/r,
28
which is a continuous function of y that extends to E
[
Lτ(yP )
]
= L(0, yP ) for Y0 = y = yP
and to E
[
Lτ(yP )
]
= −c0/r for Y0 = y = 0. Hence, E
[
Lτ(yP )
]
− L(0, y) vanishes at y =
yP , while at y = 0 it attains I + (cB − c0)/r, which is strictly positive if y
∗ > 0. Now
∂yE
[
Lτ(yP ) − L(0, y)
]
< 0 for all y ∈ (0, yP ) iff β1(c0 − cA)(y/yP )
β1−1 < cB − cA + rI for all
y ∈ (0, yP ), iff β1(c0 − cA) ≤ cB − cA + rI (since β1 > 1), i.e., iff y
∗ ≥ yP .
Proof of Proposition 4.7. As in the proof of Proposition 4.6 we begin with the determin-
istic case Y0 = 0, whence τP = ∞ and dLt = e
−rty¯ dt. In this case the Snell envelope of
L˜ = L is the smallest nonincreasing function dominating L. For y¯ ≥ 0 ⇔ y∗ ≥ 0, it is just
the constant L∞ = −c0/r and thus dDL˜ = 0, while for y¯ < 0⇔ y
∗ < 0 it is L itself and thus
dDL˜ = −dL. Both correspond to the claim, cf. also Remark 4.13.
For Y0 > 0 = X0, the solution is by Proposition 4.6 to stop the first time Y exceeds
b(0) = min(yP , y
∗). Then the Snell envelope is explicitly known for t ≤ τP , as in footnote
28 with yˆ = min(yP , y
∗), inserting Yt and discounting the brackets by e
−rt (and UL˜ = L˜ for
Y ≥ yˆ). In this case dDL˜ can be determined as the drift of UL˜ from Ito¯’s formula. One can
also reduce the following argument to the 1-dimensional case.
For X0, Y0 > 0 first note that the Snell envelope UL˜ = VL˜(X,Y ) is continuous because
VL˜(·) is a continuous function; see, e.g., Krylov (1980). The question when DL˜ is exactly the
decreasing component of the continuous semimartingale L˜ in the stopping region is addressed
28For any threshold yˆ > 0 and its hitting time τ (yˆ) := inf{t ≥ 0 | Yt ≥ yˆ} by the geometric Brownian motion
Y we have by standard results
E[Lτ(yˆ)] = −
c0
r
+
(
Y0
yˆ
)β1(
yˆ
r − µY
−
cB − c0
r
− I
)
if Y0 < yˆ.
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by Jacka (1993): It is the case if the local time of the nonnegative semimartingale UL˜ − L˜ at
0 is trivial, i.e., if L0(UL˜ − L˜) ≡ 0 (a.s.). We can show that the latter is indeed true in our
model by applying the argument of Jacka’s Theorem 6.
Specifically, Ito¯’s Lemma shows that L˜ is a continuous semimartingale with finite variation
part At :=
∫ t
0 −1s<τPe
−rs(Ys− cB + c0− rI) ds. Denote its decreasing part by A
−, which here
satisfies
dA−t = 1Y >y¯ e
−rt(Yt − cB + c0 − rI) dt
for t < τP . By Theorem 3 of Jacka (1993), dL
0
t (UL˜ − L˜) ≤ 1UL˜=L˜,t<τP
2 dA−t , and as in his
Theorem 6, dL0(UL˜ − L˜) is supported by {(X,Y ) ∈ ∂C}.
If we let A− as above for all t ∈ R+,
E
[
L0t (UL˜ − L˜)
]
≤ E
[
2
∫ t
0
1(X,Y )∈∂C,s<τP dA
−
s
]
≤ E
[
2
∫ t
0
1(X,Y )∈∂C dA
−
s
]
.
dA− apparently has a Markovian density with respect to Lebesgue measure on R+, and
our underlying diffusion (X,Y ) has a log-normal transition distribution, which thus has a
density with respect to Lebesgue measure on R2+. As ∂C = {(x, y) ∈ R
2
+ | y = b(x)} has
Lebesgue measure 0 in R2+, we conclude like in the proof of Theorem 6 of Jacka (1993) that
L0(UL˜ − L˜) ≡ 0 (a.s.).
Proof of Proposition 4.11. We need to show that
∫ τP
0
dGϑi (t)
1−Gϑi (t)
=
∫ τP
0
1Yt≥b(Xt)(Yt − y¯) dt
Xt/(r − µX)− (Yt − yP)/(r − µY )
<∞ (A.1)
on {τP < ∞} a.s. Note that τP = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt ≥ Ft} if (X0, Y0) 6= (0, 0) or yP > 0 (see the
proof of Proposition 4.10). As Y is continuous, it is bounded on [0, τP ] where this interval
is finite. Hence we may just use dt as the numerator in (A.1). We will also ignore (r − µX)
and (r − µY ), which may be encoded in the initial position (X0, Y0). By the strong Markov
property we set ϑ = 0. Hence, we will prove that
∫ τ0
0
dt
Xt − Yt + a
<∞ (A.2)
on {τ0 < ∞} a.s. for nonnegative geometric Brownian motions X and Y (under our non-
degeneracy assumption σ2X , σ
2
Y > 0, |ρ| < 1), some fixed level a > 0 and the stopping time
τε := inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt − Yt+ a ≤ ε} with ε = 0. We will treat the special case yP = a = 0 at the
very end of the proof. Define the process Z := X − Y + a to simplify notation.
As a first step and tool, we derive the weaker result E[
∫ τ0∧T
0 ln(Zt) dt] ∈ R for any time
T > 0 (which implies also
∫ τ0
0 |ln(Zt)| dt <∞ on {τ0 <∞} a.s. by the arguments towards the
end of the proof).
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Define the function f : R+ → R by
f(x) = x ln(x)− x ∈ [−1, x2]
and the function F : R+ → R by F (x) =
∫ x
0 f(y) dy ∈ [−x, x
3], such that F ′′(x) = ln(x) for
all x > 0. For localization purposes fix an ε > 0 and a time T > 0. By Ito¯’s formula we have
F (Zτε∧T ) = F (Z0)+
∫ τε∧T
0
f(Zt) dZt +
1
2
∫ τε∧T
0
ln(Zt) d[Z]t
= F (Z0)+
∫ τε∧T
0
f(Zt)
(
µXXt − µY Yt
)
dt
+
∫ τε∧T
0
f(Zt)
(
σXXt dB
X
t − σY Yt dB
Y
t
)
+
1
2
∫ τε∧T
0
ln(Zt)
(
σ2XX
2
t + σ
2
Y Y
2
t − 2ρσXσYXtYt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:σ2(Xt,Yt)
)
dt.
We want to establish limεց0E[F (Zτε∧T )], first in terms of the integrals, for which we need
some estimates.
In order to eliminate the second, stochastic integral by taking expectations, it is sufficient
to verify that 1t<τ0f(Zt)Xt and 1t<τ0f(Zt)Yt are square P ⊗ dt-integrable on Ω × [0, T ].
We have |f(Zt)| ≤ 1 + Z
2
t . For t ≤ τ0 further 0 ≤ Zt ≤ Xt + a by Yt ≥ 0 and hence
Z2t ≤ (Xt + a)
2 ≤ 2X2t + 2a
2. The sought square-integrability with X follows now from the
P ⊗ dt-integrability of Xnt on Ω× [0, T ] for any n ∈ N and analogously that for Y thanks to
0 ≤ Yt ≤ Xt + a for t ≤ τ0.
The same estimates guarantee that the expectation of the first integral converges to the
finite expectation at τ0 as ε ց 0. For the third integral we have ln(Zt) ≤ Zt ≤ Xt + a. The
second term σ2(Xt, Yt) is bounded from below by (σXXt − σY Yt)
2 ≥ 0 and from above by
(σXXt + σY Yt)
2 ≤ ((σX + σY )Xt + σY a)
2 ≤ 2(σX + σY )
2X2t + 2σ
2
Y a
2 for t ≤ τ0 (supposing
σX , σY > 0 wlog.). Hence the positive part of the integrand is bounded by a P ⊗dt-integrable
process on Ω× [0, T ], while the negative part converges monotonically, and we may take the
limit of the expectation of the whole integral.
That the latter is finite follows from analysing the limit of the LHS, limεց0E[F (Zτε∧T )],
directly. We have F (Zτε∧T ) = 1τε≤TF (ε) + 1T<τεF (ZT ), and it is continuous in ε ց 0. For
T < τ0 again 0 ≤ ZT ≤ XT + a and thus |F (ZT )| ≤ |ZT |+ |ZT |
3 ≤ (XT + a) + (XT + a)
3. As
also |F (ε)| ≤ 1 for all ε ≤ 1, |F (Zτε∧T )| is bounded by an integrable random variable as εց 0.
Consequently, limεց0E[F (Zτε∧T )] = E[F (Zτ0∧T )] ∈ R and also E[
∫ τ0∧T
0 ln(Zt)σ
2(Xt, Yt) dt] ∈
R on the RHS. In the integral we may ignore the term σ2(Xt, Yt), which completes the first
step. Indeed, with |ρ| < 1 we can only have σ2(Xt, Yt) = 0 if Xt = Yt = 0, i.e., if Zt = a.
Therefore inf{σ2(Xt, Yt) |Zt ≤ ε} > 0 for any fixed ε ∈ (0, a), so σ
2(Xt, Yt) does not “kill”
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the downside of ln(Zt) and
E
[∫ τ0∧T
0
ln(Zt) dt
]
∈ R.
In the following we further need E[
∫ τ0∧T
0 ln(Zt)Xt dt] ∈ R, which obtains as follows. With
|ρ| < 1, inf{σ2(Xt, Yt) |Zt ≤ ε} is attained only with the constraint binding, Yt = Xt + a− ε.
Thus, for Zt ≤ ε, σ
2(Xt, Yt) ≥ σ
2(Xt,Xt + a − ε). The latter is a quadratic function of
Xt, with X
2
t having coefficient σ
2(1, 1) > 0 given |ρ| < 1. The quadratic function hence
exceeds X for all X sufficiently large, i.e., we can pick K > 0 such that σ2(Xt, Yt) ≥ Xt
on {Zt ≤ ε} ∩ {Xt ≥ K}. Xt thus does not “blow up” the downside of ln(Zt) more than
σ2(Xt, Yt).
We are now ready to analyse
f(Zτε∧T ) = f(Z0)+
∫ τε∧T
0
ln(Zt) dZt +
1
2
∫ τε∧T
0
1
Zt
d[Z]t
= f(Z0)+
∫ τε∧T
0
ln(Zt)
(
µXXt − µY Yt
)
dt
+
∫ τε∧T
0
ln(Zt)
(
σXXt dB
X
t − σY Yt dB
Y
t
)
+
1
2
∫ τε∧T
0
1
Zt
σ2(Xt, Yt) dt
when taking the limit ε ց 0 under expectations as before. By our final observations of
step one the first integral converges (note again Yt ≤ Xt + a for t ≤ τ0). In the second,
stochastic integral we now have |ln(Zt)| ≤ |ln(ε)|+ |Zt| for t ≤ τε, an even smaller bound than
above, making the expectation vanish. In the third integral, σ2(Xt, Yt)/Zt ≥ 0 for t ≤ τ0, so
monotone convergence holds.
On the LHS, |f(Zτε∧T )| is bounded by an integrable random variable for all ε ≤ 1
analogously to the first step, implying limεց0E[f(Zτε∧T )] = E[f(Zτ0∧T )] ∈ R and thus
E[
∫ τ0∧T
0 σ
2(Xt, Yt)/Zt dt] < ∞. By the same arguments brought forward at the end of the
first step we can again ignore σ2(Xt, Yt).
With E[
∫ τ0∧T
0 1/Zt dt] < ∞, P [{τ0 ≤ T} ∩ {
∫ τ0
0 1/Zt dt = ∞}] = 0. As T was arbitrary,
we may take the union over all integer T to conclude P [{τ0 < ∞} ∩ {
∫ τ0
0 1/Zt dt = ∞}] = 0.
This completes the proof of (A.2) for the case a > 0 (and that of (A.1) for yP > 0).
Some modification is due for the case yP = a = 0 and if (X0, Y0) 6= (0, 0) (otherwise
τ0 = 0 and (A.2) is trivial). Then σ
2(Xt, Yt) is not bounded away from 0 for Zt small, it may
be an important factor in the integrability of ln(Zt)σ
2(Xt, Yt) when (Xt, Yt) is close to the
origin. In order to infer the required well-behaved limit of E[
∫ τε∧T
0 ln(Zt)
(
µXXt − µY Yt
)
dt]
and to finally remove σ2(Xt, Yt) from
∫ τ0
0 σ
2(Xt, Yt)/Zt dt, one can employ another localization
procedure: Fix a small δ > 0 and use the minimum of σδ := inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt + Yt < δ} and
τε ∧ T everywhere above. Then σ
2(Xt, Yt) is bounded away from 0 on [0, σδ ∧ τ0] for |ρ| < 1
and again bounded below by a quadratic function with X2t having coefficient σ
2(1, 1) > 0.
The result now obtains as above for all paths with Xt + Yt ≥ δ on [0, τ0]. As δ > 0 is indeed
arbitrary and any path with (X0, Y0) 6= (0, 0) is bounded away from the origin on [0, τ0] finite
by continuity, the claim follows.
A.2 Outcome Probabilities
The following definition is a simplification of that in Riedel and Steg (2014), resulting from
right-continuity of any αϑi (·) also where it takes the value 0.
Define the functions µL and µM from [0, 1]
2 \ (0, 0) to [0, 1] by
µL(x, y) :=
x(1− y)
x+ y − xy
and µM(x, y) :=
xy
x+ y − xy
.
µL(ai, aj) is the probability that firm i stops first in an infinitely repeated stopping game where
i plays constant stage stopping probabilities ai and firm j plays constant stage probabilities
aj . µM (ai, aj) is the probability of simultaneous stopping and 1 − µL(ai, aj) − µM(ai, aj) =
µL(aj , ai) that of firm j stopping first.
Definition A.1. Given ϑ ∈ T and a pair of extended mixed strategies
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
and
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
,
the outcome probabilities λϑL,1, λ
ϑ
L,2 and λ
ϑ
M at τˆ
ϑ := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑ1 (t)+α
ϑ
2 (t) > 0} are defined
as follows. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
If τˆϑ < τˆϑj := inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
j (t) > 0}, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ)
)
,
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
αϑi (τˆ
ϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ).
If τˆϑ < τˆϑi := inf{t ≥ ϑ |α
ϑ
i (t) > 0}, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1− αj(τˆ
ϑ)
)
∆Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ),
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
αϑj (τˆ
ϑ)∆Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ).
If τˆϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆ
ϑ
2 and α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ) + αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) > 0, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
µL(α
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ), αϑj (τˆ
ϑ)),
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
µM (α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ), αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ)).
32
If τˆϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆ
ϑ
2 and α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ) + αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) = 0, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
) 1
2
{
lim inf
tցτˆϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µL(α
ϑ
i (t), α
ϑ
j (t))
+ lim sup
tցτˆϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µL(α
ϑ
i (t), α
ϑ
j (t))
}
,
λϑM := 0.
Remark A.2.
(i) λϑM is the probability of simultaneous stopping at τˆ
ϑ, while λϑL,i is the probability of
firm i becoming the leader, i.e., that of firm j becoming follower. It holds that λϑM +
λϑL,i + λ
ϑ
L,j =
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
. Dividing by
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
where feasible yields the corresponding conditional probabilities.
(ii) If any αϑ· = 1, then no limit argument is needed. Otherwise both α
ϑ
· are right-continuous
and the corresponding limit of µM exists. µL, however, has no continuous extension at
the origin, whence we use the symmetric combination of lim inf and lim sup, ensuring
consistency whenever the limit does exist. If the limit in a potential equilibrium does
not exist, both firms will be indifferent about the roles; see Lemma A.5 in Riedel and
Steg (2014).
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